Minor Threat

He was reacting to a recent report by provincial disciplinary authorities which exposed six cases of rural officials embezzling public assets. One case revealed that Cao Jun, former Party secretary of a Liaoyang rural community called Kongxing, allegedly embezzled over 87.3 million yuan (US$12.3m) from the village collective fund and misappropriated another 82.8 million yuan (US$11.7m).　

The startling contrast: the county’s total revenue last year was just 998 million yuan (US$140.7m).　

The report highlighted that many of Cao’s ill-gotten funds came from a resettlement project in which the county compensated 800 villagers for appropriated land and developed a new community for them elsewhere.　

Experts argue that public projects involving resource allocation are a leading trigger for large-scale corruption among low-ranking officials – a phenomenon not uncommon in Chinese governance.

The Liaoyang resettlement project began in July 2012 when most villagers agreed to move in exchange for government compensation and new apartments. To ensure quality control, the county granted the villagers’ request to build the new complex themselves.　

The village established the Liaoyang Yonglian Real Estate Company, financed with 406 million yuan (US$58m) from the county government. Though registered in the village’s name, the company’s largest shareholders were three community officials, including Cao Jun.　

Li Wei, deputy director of the county’s No.10 discipline inspection office, revealed that the project – completed in 2014 – turned a significant profit, bolstered by its buildings developed for commercial use. One of the properties was sold to the county government for 110 million yuan (US$15.5m), much of which Cao embezzled, allegedly buying 44 private apartments in the resort city of Sanya, Hainan Province.　

Although Cao Jun exited the company in 2015, he maintained control through its new president, Cao Hua (no relation), who held a 90 percent stake.　

“No matter who controls it, Yonglian was established as a village collective company, so all of its profits should have belonged to the village community,” Li told NewsChina.　

In May 2024, Cao Jun was expelled from the Party, and his case was sent to a municipal court for further investigation.

Numerous reports have exposed similar cases. For instance, over 10 years ago, Hao Pengjun, former Party secretary of a county coal bureau in Shanxi Province, was sentenced to 20 years in prison for corruption and bribery involving more than 300 million yuan (US$42.3m). In 2011, Luo Yaping, former director of a district bureau in Fushun, Liaoning Province, was executed for embezzling 145 million yuan (US$20.5m) from land requisition projects.　

The CCDI said that Luo absconded with residents’ compensation funds, describing the corruption case as involving “the lowest-ranking official and the biggest amount of money in the meanest way.”　

More recently, in 2021, Li Jianping, a district-level Party secretary in Hohhot, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, embezzled and took bribes of over 3 billion yuan (US$423.3m) from construction and land requisition projects between 2006 and 2016. He was sentenced to death.

　

In an interview with the CCDI, Bao Rengui, director of the discipline inspection committee of Wushan County, Chongqing, warned that corruption risks are rising in rural revitalization projects.　

Money-related projects are consistently the biggest cause of corruption. Reviewing similar major cases over the past two decades, NewsChina found the majority of corrupt officials, though low-ranking, were responsible for resource allocation. This included approving construction projects, managing resettlement initiatives or overseeing a department’s public funds.　

“Construction and civil affairs are where lower officials’ large-scale corruption is most concentrated,” read an August commentary published on newspaper Jiefang Daily’s WeChat account. “Low ranking does not mean less power. In fact, it can mean greater power if tied to resource allocation,” the piece continued, citing the 2015 case of Xu Yueming, a former accountant with the Electricity Power Bureau of Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province. Xu embezzled 5.9 million yuan (US$800,000) from electricity fees intended for street lighting.　

“Behind something as simple as street lighting lies millions in expenses,” read the commentary. “Since the whole city needs thousands of lights, all requiring daily maintenance, electricity and advertising rentals... bribery can occur at nearly every stage.”　

This was supported by a 2016 survey by the Municipal People’s Procuratorate of Zhenjiang, Jiangsu Province, which found more than half of local official corruption cases involved county or village officials in charge of civil affairs, including new village construction, land requisition, resettlement and healthcare allowances.

While these numbers highlight the progress of anti-corruption efforts, they also emphasize the difficulty of eradicating low-ranking corruption.　

A July commentary pointed to poor supervision as a key factor. “Corruption among low-ranking officials is nearly invisible but causes tremendous harm, so we must work harder to eradicate it,” said the commentary published in China Comment, a political news journal under Xinhua News Agency.　

Chinese officials are supervised by local congresses, discipline inspection committees and auditing bodies. However, Associate Professor Cai Lewei with the China University of Political Science and Law pointed out that these mechanisms often fail, particularly in rural areas.　

For example, Cao’s company was set up without the village’s required plenary meeting vote, and he replaced the other two official representatives with his wife and son.　

Low-ranking officials often operate within complex local networks of relationships that shield them from scrutiny.　

In some cases, like that of Hao Pengjun, it took a State Council investigation to expose his long-standing corruption and illegal running of a coal mine. Media reports revealed that Luo Yapin built a close-knit network of relationships to expand her influence, using both financial and even sexual bribery.　

This highlights the need for reform, as the Jiefang Daily commentary called for a clear separation of power within individual departments and officials, alongside strengthened oversight.　

“Many cases show that the warning signs of corruption among low-ranking officials were there, but weak supervision allowed the corruption to grow until the questionable sums became too large to ignore,” said Wu Xiaofeng, an official from the municipal discipline inspection committee of Liuyang, Hunan Province in a 2017 interview with the CCDI website. “We must ensure accountability at every level, extending from key positions to all posts and Party members,”

The CCDI has also expanded public reporting channels and strengthened grassroots supervision. Some places set up public supervision stations for direct reporting and dispatched investigators to follow up on tips.　

NewsChina found that in many cases, local residents were first to report corruption to authorities. In Cao’s case, locals reported seeing his wife and son driving luxury cars. In the first half of 2024, disciplinary organs and prosecutors received 1.75 million corruption reports from the public, according to the CCDI.　

The CPC’s latest Resolution on Further Deepening Reform Comprehensively to Advance Chinese Modernization, issued at the Party’s third plenary session of the 20th Central Committee on July 18, pledged to “work hard to eradicate the breeding grounds and conditions for corruption.”　

“We will improve the mechanisms for investigating and addressing instances of both misconduct and corruption, intensify efforts to uproot corruption in sectors with a high concentration of power, funds and resources,” the Resolution read.