s leaders of China and the US have repeatedly reaffirmed, including during their May summit in Beijing, the two countries make up the world's most important bilateral relationship. Both sides recognize that their ties have a direct and profound impact not only on the wellbeing of their own peoples but also on global peace and prosperity.
However, concerns over the Thucydides Trap, the idea that conflict is likely between a rising power and the established one, have cast a shadow over bilateral ties. Debates over decoupling and strategic competition have become increasingly prominent in official, business and public discourse, even as economic interdependence has long served as the "ballast stone" in the relationship.
In addition, as the world's two largest economies rebalance their ties, conflicts in Europe and the Middle East are putting regional stability, global politics and supply chains under growing strain.
Does this changing landscape reduce the importance of China-US relations? Is there a new "ballast stone" for stability between the two countries, and can China bring greater certainty to an increasingly volatile world?
To explore these questions, NewsChina spoke with Da Wei, director of the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) and a professor of international relations at Tsinghua University.
He argues that "mutually assured disruption," the capacity of both sides to seriously disrupt each other's economies and supply chains, has become a new source of stability in bilateral relations. He also believes changes in China-US relations should be understood within the broader unraveling of the post-Cold War international order, and calls for joint efforts to maintain existing connectivity between the two major powers.
NewsChina: You have argued that changes in US policy toward China over the past eight years reflect not only concerns about strategic competition but also domestic challenges and broader shifts in the US's security and economic relations with the world. Both countries are looking inward in their development more than before. And because of all that, you think China is not on the top of the urgency list of the US. Given this, why do both countries still describe China-US ties as the world's most important bilateral relationship?
DW: I think for the US, the urgency of dealing with relations with China may have reduced to some extent, at least in the short term. But the importance of the bilateral relationship has not. For both China and the US, their bilateral relations remain the single most consequential bilateral relationship in the world.
This reduced urgency is happening in a context where the broader environment surrounding the relationship has changed. Before President Donald Trump, during the Obama administration and even earlier, globalization was at its peak, which was thought to benefit all and was welcomed by all. This was why the central issues in China-US relations at that time revolved around economic integration: how far China would open its markets, how quickly China's reform process would move and how deeply the two economies could become intertwined.
Since Trump's first term, China-US relations have been in a downward trajectory. However, looking back over the past decade, this was also a result and symptom of a much broader transformation in the international order. The US thinks that the old order is detrimental to US interests, and intends to adjust the world order and its relations with the rest of the world, including China of course. This adjustment tops US national strategy. China is regarded as a part of the adjustment process, not the only part, or the most urgent one.
However, reduced urgency does not reduce importance. They are two different things. President Trump's recent visit also shows how much importance both sides attach to the bilateral relationship. Actually, high urgency often means there is imminent tension. Now the two countries are working together to bring more stability to their relationship to reduce the number and intensity of urgent issues to address.
The importance of their bilateral relations depends on various aspects. But the core reason, I think, is that for both sides, the greatest external force shaping one's long-term development goals comes from the other. This is true for China's aspiration for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and is also true for the US's attempt to secure its position as the world's largest superpower. They can have positive or negative impacts on each other, depending on whether their relationship is good or not.
NC: China and the US have agreed to build "a constructive relationship of strategic stability." In the past, economic interdependence largely defined bilateral ties. Why is strategic stability now being highlighted, and what does it mean?
DW: Economic ties were once seen as a ballast stone simply because bilateral economic exchanges were enormous in the 1990s and 2000s thanks to globalization, a period when economic integration was widely expected and embraced around the world. In an era driven and defined by economics, it was natural for economic interdependence to be the primary force binding countries together.
Today, that era has largely given way to strategic reckoning. Even if trade relations between China and the US had not weakened, economics and trade alone could no longer play the same stabilizing role. With strategic considerations dominating national agendas, the deeper the engagement between the two countries in certain areas, the more those areas are likely to generate potential friction points. Greater connectivity can mean greater potential for tension. This is exactly why we have a vision for strategic stability today.
Strategic stability here refers to overall stability. There are positive, cooperative and confrontational aspects of the relationship, but overall it must be kept stable. Second, it refers to stability on the most important issue, which is peace. Peace between China and the US carries fundamental strategic importance not only for the two countries, but for the whole world.
The focus on strategic stability also reflects both sides' recognition that bilateral relations are currently in a difficult phase, and that, even if not the most satisfactory outcome, maintaining strategic stability is the most acceptable one. So I think this is a pragmatic vision for the two countries.
NC: You have described China-US economic ties as evolving to "mutually assured disruption," which has helped stabilize relations over the past year. With the recent trade talks producing "generally balanced and positive outcomes," does this indicate economic interdependence could regain some ground and abate the role of mutually assured disruptions?
DW: I would not say the economic interdependence has been replaced by mutually assured disruption, though the interdependence has been weakened. China and the US still retain a significant degree of economic interdependence. But it is no longer as deep, comprehensive or widely embraced as it was before.
What has emerged during this process is a new reality: Both sides have discovered that complete decoupling from each other is simply impossible, because either side holds the ability to inflict serious costs on the other. This is why I would call it mutually assured disruption, and it has verified conversely how resilient this economic interdependence still is.
Mutually assured disruption works if one can prove it holds the ability of causing disruption in certain parts of the other's supply chain. Economic interdependence is still the defining feature of China-US economic ties. Mutually assured disruption functions as a bottom line that helps safeguard that interdependence.
It is hard to say now if economic independence will rise again. The trade and investment councils they have agreed to establish during the trade talks [between Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng and US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent] in South Korea ahead of the state visit may bring real good changes. But it takes time.
NC: You have said tensions in China- US relations are pushing both countries to focus more on domestic development. How can China turn this inward focus into an advantage for its own growth, and in turn help stabilize bilateral relations?
DW: This is an era in which peace and stability must be sought through strength. The strength makes sense in two ways. One is conventional hard power: enough military, technological and economic capability that the other side must take your interests seriously. The other is the kind of strength where neither can afford to disengage from the relationship.
For any country, the biggest source of insecurity is the risk of setbacks in development, which is often driven by high anxiety under sustained pressure of security concern. This is particularly true for China as the world's secondlargest economy. China has no option but to work towards full-fledged development.
NC: As the traditional frameworks for cooperation weaken and strategic distrust remains high, are there new areas where China and the US can maintain connectivity in trade, technology and society?
DW: I think that it would already be a major win to preserve the existing connectivity, or even just slow or moderate the pace of disengagement. There are hundreds of billions of dollars of annual bilateral trade and more than 200,000 Chinese students in the US. There is already huge connectivity to secure.
There are areas with potential to reinforce the existing connectivity: tariff negotiations, investment discussions, Chinese purchases of American soybeans and Boeing aircraft in exchange for eased US technology export controls, as well as military risk management.
But normally, cooperation is more difficult than connectivity. There are talks about cooperating in public health issues like fighting cancer or Ebola in Africa, and in AI governance. But the prospect of realizing them anytime soon seems unlikely.
The question is not how to immediately find new, dazzling flagship joint projects, but how to maintain the extensive but damaged web of existing connections.
NC: As global volatility increases, many countries hope China can provide greater certainty. How can China do that? Does it also mean China will take on greater responsibility in global governance, and will have more coordination with the US on major global security issues such as the conflicts in the Middle East and the Ukraine crisis?
DW: There are basically two ways a major country can provide certainty to the world. One is to offer bilateral guarantees, such as aid commitments and direct development support. For example, starting May 1, China expanded its zero-tariff treatment to cover all 53 African countries which have diplomatic ties with China.
But no country can unilaterally provide certainty to many countries. So the second and best way for China to provide certainty to the world is to uphold international rules and institutions. If other countries clearly know that China will support the same principles consistently, for example, opposition to violations of the UN Charter and support for national sovereignty and international law, then they do not need to guess China's position every time a crisis emerges. That predictability itself is certainty for the world.
In today's world, the problem is that there are too many breaches of rules. So for China, the most effective contribution is to firmly uphold the UN-centered international system and the international order based on international law.
As the international order becomes increasingly fragmented and unstable, upholding international norms and institutions is a form of leadership. Many countries are looking to China to assume a larger global role. China is already doing this and showing growing leadership in global governance.
China should contribute where it can genuinely make a difference, through regional mediation and facilitating dialogue among conflicting parties. We have already seen examples of that in the Middle East, such as the Saudi- Iran rapprochement [in 2023], and in China's neighborhood between Thailand and Cambodia, which reached a ceasefire agreement in China at the end of 2025.
The US's interest in global issues is diminishing. What Washington is pursuing now is a world order that maximizes its unilateral advantages. While the US is gradually retreating from providing global public good, no other country currently possesses the capacity to completely fill that gap. This is why the world is now facing a severe global governance deficit.
China and the US may see more communication and engagement on gloal issues, both positive and negative, if they maintain intensive high-level exchanges.
But China must be cautious about how much it can do in global governance. China must act within its capabilities. What I am very skeptical of is the argument that China should automatically fill the vacuum of leadership or hegemony left by the US. I think that is unrealistic. It is not what China wants to do. It is not what China should be expected to do.
Old Version
